



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME XXXII NUMBER 13

Britain, Egypt and the Sudan

by J. C. Hurewitz

"I must emphasize . . . that this is not an ordinary instance of a dependent territory proceeding towards self-government," British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden cautioned the House of Commons on February 12, 1953 when he announced the conclusion that day of an agreement with Egypt for a settlement in the Sudan. With characteristic understatement Eden went on to observe that "there are many complications arising from the peculiar status of the Sudan as a condominium."

The latest instrument represents the first break in a deadlock which has poisoned Anglo-Egyptian relations for more than three decades. Yet in order to appreciate the "many complications" we have to reach back at least to the autumn of 1898, when the decision was taken to create the condominium.

At that time the Ottoman government and the major European powers, particularly France, had not yet recognized the British occupation of Egypt which, despite Whitehall's earlier assurances of its provisional character, had already passed its 16th year and drifted into permanence. Seeking to avoid a European war which French opposition threatened, Britain did not attempt to alter the

juridical status of Egypt and exercised no more than *de facto* sovereignty in this Ottoman province.

When the British first occupied Egypt in 1882, among the problems they inherited was a year-old revolt of the Sudanese Muslims, led by a religious mystic, al-Mahdi Muhammad Ahmad b. 'Abdallah. The Sudan itself, progressively annexed by Egypt after 1820, technically became Ottoman domain. For Egypt, after less than a decade of virtual independence, was restored to the Ottoman government in 1841 under guarantees by the concert of Europe, and the hereditary Egyptian governors or viceroys—styled "Khedive" after 1867—remained vassals of the Ottoman Sultan. When the British ordered the evacuation of Anglo-Egyptian forces from the Sudan in 1884-85 in the face of the Mahdist movement, it was Ottoman territory that was abandoned.

The abandonment of an area embracing more than 950,000 square miles in size in the heyday of the European "scramble" for Africa merely served to whet the appetite of France. Besides, the French government hoped in 1896 that if it dispatched a diminutive military force to the upper Nile, the British could

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be compelled to seek a compromise settlement of the Egyptian question. Britain undertook the reconquest of the Sudan in 1896-98 with an Anglo-Egyptian expedition primarily to forestall French designs.

The crisis at Fashoda (now Kodok), where British and French forces confronted each other for more than six weeks (September 18-October 3, 1898), strained Anglo-French relations almost to the breaking point. Although the French finally withdrew, Britain did not wish further to offend France and maintained the fiction that the campaign was being executed in the name of the Khedive of Egypt.

Creation of the Condominium

In the circumstances, Lord Cromer, Her Majesty's Agent and Consul General in Egypt, had to devise a formula which would placate France, prevent Ottoman interference, exclude the European powers from the enjoyment of capitulatory privileges in the Sudan, admit Egypt to a role in the administration of the territory and establish British paramountcy. "It was manifest," noted Lord Cromer, "that these conflicting requirements could not be satisfied without the creation of some hybrid form of government, hitherto unknown to international jurisprudence." The form was a condominium, or the joint administration of the Sudan by Britain and Egypt. The British claim to a share in the administration rested on the right of conquest.

Indeed, this contention was embodied in the preamble of an agree-

ment, which Britain signed with Egypt on January 19, 1899, establishing the condominium. The instrument left no doubt that of the two co-domini, Britain was the senior. The Egyptian flag (i.e., the Ottoman flag) as well as the British, it is true, was to be used throughout the territory, and no import duties were to be imposed on goods coming from Egypt. But the governor-general of the Sudan, although "appointed by Khedivial Decree on the recommendation of Her Britannic Majesty's Government and . . . removed only by Khedivial Decree, with the consent of Her Britannic Majesty's Government," was vested with full executive, legislative and military authority. Egyptian laws were declared inoperative in the Sudan, as were the capitulatory and consular rights of the European powers.

The validity of the 1899 agreement could be challenged, since the Ottoman Sultan had expressly forbidden the Egyptian Khedive from entering into political arrangements with foreign powers or "on any pretext or motive, [to] abandon to others, in whole or in part, the privileges accorded to Egypt, which are intrusted to him, and which pertain to the inherent rights of the Sovereign Power [the Ottoman government]. . . ." It could be argued, however, that the Sudan would have been lost in the 1880's, even if Britain had not occupied Egypt, and would not have been reconquered in the 1890's without British military and financial aid.

Besides, until the end of World War I Egyptians stood to gain no

more from pressing for exclusive control over the Sudan than from demanding the termination of the British occupation in Egypt itself. For the alternative to the presence of the British was not independence at home and hegemony in the Sudan, but Ottoman suzerainty in both. And the Ottoman government, despite the cogency of its legal position, did not possess the means or the power to make its protests to Britain effective.

These legal and political ambiguities notwithstanding, the condominium was immediately launched on its unique existence. Egyptian and British troops garrisoned the Sudan. For their upkeep the Egyptian treasury contributed £1 million annually; the British exchequer, one-fifth that sum. Egypt, moreover, covered the annual budgetary deficits of the Sudan and issued the Sudan government loans for the construction of public works. Also before World War I Egyptians filled all the middle-grade civil service posts, for no Sudanese qualified for government employment except at the lowest level. Britain, for its part, provided not only the governors-general but all his principal advisers, who directed every branch of the administration. And the Sudan government itself, to all intents and purposes, was conducted as a British colony.

(This is the first of three articles on the Anglo-Egyptian problem in the Sudan by Dr. Hurewitz, assistant professor of government, Near and Middle East Studies Program, School of International Affairs, Columbia University. His book, tentatively entitled *Middle East Dilemmas: Background for United States Policy*, is scheduled for publication this spring.)

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Military Prospects in Asia

The new Republican Administration in Washington is slowly undoing the policy on Asia which the Truman Administration developed in response to Republican pressure. After the fall of China to the Communists in September 1949, opposition members of Congress demanded that the United States try to weaken communism in Asia. In a vain effort to placate these "Asia-firsters," the Truman Administration put increasing emphasis in foreign policy on Asian matters. These members of Congress have not changed their opinion, but their party colleagues in the White House and the State Department seem less impressed by their influence than was the case with the previous Administration.

In effect the new Administration is slowly preparing for the withdrawal of the United States from active participation in Asian affairs. This policy is subject to reversal if the White House and State Department find that the Asia-firsters still have the authority with which they used to be credited. The success of the policy, and therefore the success of President Eisenhower in holding the Asia-first group at bay, probably depends on the military competence of Asian governments and troops to maintain at least the present boundary between Communist and non-Communist areas in the Far East.

Asia for the Asians

Before they had been a month in office President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had begun to develop their Asian policy. Their first move momentarily left the impression that the United States contemplated a greater in-

volvement in Asia. On February 2 President Eisenhower lifted the restriction that had been imposed in June 1950 prohibiting the Nationalist Chinese forces on Formosa from striking against the Communist-controlled mainland. This action, however, did little more than expose the helplessness of the Nationalists led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

It has now been made clear that they lack the planes and ships necessary to cross the 100-mile strait from Formosa in numbers sufficient to be effective. The subsequent announcement that the United States would be represented on Formosa by an Ambassador, Karl L. Rankin, could not compensate for the physical facts, long known to well-informed observers, about the Nationalists' weaknesses. Subsequently, President Eisenhower declined to use American military power to weaken the Chinese Communists economically, announcing on February 17 that he was not considering a blockade or embargo of Communist China. On the following day Mr. Dulles said that the State Department was examining all possible ways, even by blockade, to stop the flow of strategic goods to China; but he promptly added that such a study had been going on since the Chinese Communists entered the Korean war in the autumn of 1950. Impressed by the influence of Asia-firsters, the Truman Administration was unwilling to show openly its hostility toward the blockade. The new Administration is more at ease in this regard.

President Eisenhower has also refused to invite trouble in the Far East in connection with the repudiation of the Yalta accord of 1945.

While the President in his Inaugural Address called for denunciation of American obligations assumed in secret understandings like those reached at Yalta, he made it clear subsequently, when a resolution for repudiation was being drafted for submission to Congress, that he had no intention of attacking specific clauses in the agreement—such an attack might, for example, have committed the United States to the liberation of the Kuriles from the Soviet Union—but only of setting forth a general principle. Again, this stand collided with positions taken in the past by some Asia-firsters.

The crux of the policy of withdrawal is the intention to remove Western troops from Korea and Indochina and replace them with local troops. Secretary Dulles disclosed this aim at a press conference on February 18. He implied that this policy would strengthen the West by freeing for action elsewhere the United States and French forces now tied down in Asia. Furthermore, he said, the replacement of those troops with Korean and Indochinese forces might make it possible for each side in Korea, at least, to find an acceptable solution to the war.

The present military situation in both Korea and Indochina is in effect a stalemate. Fighting in Korea dates from 1950; in Indochina, from 1947. Ten Korean divisions are already supporting the United Nations forces, and in Indochina the local forces in the field opposing the Indochinese Communist-led revolutionaries outnumber the French. If the United States and France pull out their own men when enough Indochinese and

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What Should the New Administration Do About Psycho- logical Warfare?

by Mark A. May

Dr. May, Professor of Educational Psychology and Director of the Institute of Human Relations at Yale University, has been a member of the United States Advisory Commission on Information since its organization in 1948 and chairman of the Commission since April 1952.

This question is now receiving considerable attention in Washington. The United States Advisory Commission on Information recently recommended that the Voice of America and all other psychological warfare and overseas information programs be entrusted to a new Federal agency of cabinet level. Further reports are pending from a subcommittee of the Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee and from a special *ad hoc* committee appointed recently by the President with William H. Jackson as chairman. When these reports are in, major decisions are expected.

What the new Administration should do will depend, of course, on a close examination of what is now being done. Let us glance briefly at this. No less than five government agencies and a great many private organizations are now conducting overseas programs of information, propaganda and psychological warfare. The largest of these is the International Information Administration of the State Department. This agency operates the Voice of America, a documentary motion picture service, a press and publications service, the exchange of persons program, and overseas libraries and information centers. The Mutual Security and Technical Assistance administrations each have overseas programs of publicity and education. The Central Intelligence Agency has its own program. The Department of Defense has public relations officers attached to overseas forces and conducts the psychological warfare in Korea.

The operating policies of these agencies are coordinated in Washing-

ton through voluntary participation in the deliberations of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Operations Committee, the chairman of which is the administrator of the International Information Administration of the State Department. Overseas the information activities of State and Mutual Security have been merged in the countries of Western Europe but not elsewhere.

Above the level of these operating agencies stands the National Security Council composed of the President, the Vice-President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Mutual Security Administrator, the Defense Mobilizer and others. Its duty is to advise the President on all matters of national security with a view to effective teamwork among all operating agencies. One arm of the Council is the Psychological Strategy Board responsible for developing the over-all strategy of psychological warfare and for issuing policy directives to operating agencies. But the Board has no authority over operations.

This, in brief, is the present situation. What should be done about it? There are two obvious weaknesses in the existing machinery, and a third that is not so obvious. The first is the need for better coordination of the work of the operating agencies; the second is the weak link between the Psychological Strategy Board and the operating agencies; the third is the question whether an over-all grand strategy for winning the cold war has actually been developed. Let us consider each of these briefly, beginning with the third.

It is generally believed that the

new Administration has a plan for ending the Korean war without provoking war with Russia. It has been hinted that there is in process the formulation of a plan for breaking the strangle hold of the Kremlin on millions of enslaved peoples, again without provoking a third world war. But does the new Administration have a long-range plan for building the mutual understandings among the peoples of the world that are prerequisite to the existence of a free and peaceful family of nations? Does the Psychological Strategy Board have a plan for convincing the peoples of the world that communism is a slave trap and that without freedom for all peoples there can be neither world peace nor prosperity?

Need for Central Agency

Certainly there is no lack of top-level machinery for developing a master plan for winning the cold war. This machinery, however, has a basic weakness. It does not have authority to execute its plans. Do we not need, therefore, a central operating agency responsible to the National Security Council and vested with authority to coordinate in Washington and to consolidate overseas the information programs of all United States government agencies? Obviously the head of this agency should be a member of the Security Council. The Psychological Strategy Board should be the top planning group of the proposed agency.

Separating the International Information Administration from the State Department and placing it in

(Continued on page 6)

by Ellis-M. Zacharias

Admiral Zacharias devoted 25 of his 38 years of service in the Navy to intelligence work. Author of two best-sellers, *Secret Missions* (New York, Putnam, 1946) and *Behind Closed Doors* (New York, Putnam, 1950), he has since his retirement become a radio commentator and lecturer.

We must understand at the outset what is meant by propaganda and also where propaganda fits into United States policy. In defining the one, we cover simultaneously the other.

The eyes of the world are focused upon the United States; the ears of the world are listening for pronouncements of American policy. What we say and do immediately affects the world's thinking—both about the United States and the principles for which we stand and about our enemies and the principles for which they stand. Our every act and word, therefore, have their psychological effect—whether we plan it so or not.

Now, those words and deeds which are consciously planned to affect the world's thinking in our favor and in support of free democratic institutions and principles, or to turn the world's thinking against the enemies of the United States and of human freedom, constitute our total psychological action.

Thus our psychological action is twofold. It seeks to construct, to build support for the United States and for world progress toward freedom and the goals of democratic societies everywhere. It also seeks to destroy—to weaken our enemies and destroy everywhere the false ideas which are hostile to human progress toward peace and freedom. That part of psychological action directed against a hostile country or idea constitutes psychological warfare.

Any message or information intended to influence the thinking and action of others is propaganda. Although, obviously, propaganda can

be lies ("black" propaganda) or a mixture of lies and truth ("grey" propaganda), it can also be truth ("white" propaganda).

Therefore, propaganda fits into American policy not only as a legitimate activity but also as an absolutely essential activity. It is inseparable from our total foreign policy and from all forms of United States psychological action.

Propaganda and State Department

Our propaganda must be effective. Can it be effective as a function of the State Department? To answer that question we must consider both the job and the machinery of propaganda.

To do a job we must have a positive political goal. We must be "for" something and not "against" everything. We must keep hope and determination alive in the hearts of our friends both outside and inside the Iron Curtain because their aspirations for a better life are today in danger. To both we must emphasize our historical position of the original revolutionaries for the independence of peoples. But we must keep before them the goals for which peoples are striving—in terms of their own cultures, not ours.

While we talk, we must act. Propaganda has many facets. For example, the visit of a man-of-war to certain ports or areas is not primarily to show our strength, but rather to display the flag and well-behaved crews who can talk about our real freedoms; similarly, a surprise airlift like that which recently carried thou-

sands of stranded Muslim pilgrims to Mecca; or in war, sound advice like that which discreetly kept the Italian fleet safely in port while the British were unhampered in their operations in the Mediterranean.

We must clarify the term "democracy," distorted by the Russians for their own purposes, and show that "freedom" and "liberty" are the ends of real democracy.

We must emphasize our hatred of war to refute the Russian charges of warmongering and aggression. We must appeal to the cultural pride of every country. We must stop boasting of America's plenty except indirectly. It took the Russians some time to realize that their use of moving pictures of strikes in the United States was producing a reaction contrary to that intended because the Russian audiences noticed only the decent clothes and good shoes worn by the workers.

Our loans, gifts and other aids to the world in some instances created misunderstandings, even hostility, instead of making friends because we have failed to stress that our help was intended to enable others to help themselves and each other. Our guidance should be designed not to stir up untimely disorders, but to offer constructive suggestions to people who are not yet in a position to work out their own destinies, who are thwarted in self-government, who are trapped everywhere by Moscow's "peace" offensive. How can we do this? In Europe we can talk in terms of their own history to stress what the Europeans want to be. In Asia we can show the exploitation of Asian national ambitions by the Kremlin and the perversion of these ambitions to Russian purposes. And most important, we should take a forthright stand on the independence of peoples who are capable of self-government.

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May

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a new central agency would divorce propaganda from diplomacy but not from top-level foreign policy. Furthermore, it would raise the level of psychological warfare in the structure of the government. Global propaganda cannot be planned and executed successfully from the level of an Assistant Secretary of State.

A third weakness in the present situation is the lack of unification of the field activities of the operating agencies. In each country all programs should be consolidated under the direction and control of a single officer, responsible to the head of the central agency in Washington but reporting to, and keeping in close touch with, the United States Ambassador. His role should be analogous to that of a field commander in time of war. Some of his activities will be conducted from the embassy; others may not.

The new Administration has taken a step toward the coordination of the work of operating agencies by the appointment of C. D. Jackson, former publisher of *Fortune*, to the White House staff. It is a step in the right direction, but further steps are needed to correct this basic defect.

Finally, there is need for a permanent joint Congressional Committee on Psychological Warfare for purposes similar to those served by the joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Zacharias

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United States propaganda must also attack and destroy Soviet lies in order to regain the psychological offensive. We have lost it through default. Our successful counterattack last May to the germ warfare charges is proof enough of this. This was a private counterattack, not conducted by the Voice of America. The Rus-

sians have not mentioned germ warfare since then.

We must continually emphasize the difference between the actions of the Soviet regimes and the wishes of their peoples. We must point to Russian aggressive action everywhere, their "invasion" of Austria, a friendly country, not an enemy. We must unmask Russian-style "liberation." And we must stress the perversion of socialist promises into dictatorships, of global promises into global wars.

All of this constitutes attack—and so raises important questions. How can the diplomatic agency of the United States which is charged with the task of communicating and negotiating with the U.S.S.R., also act as an attacker? How can we combine two opposite tasks in one? Can a diplomatic agency carry on an undiplomatic activity without destroying its usefulness in its primary function?

The answers are clearly in the negative. An effective propaganda effort, therefore, requires the removal of propaganda from the State Department and its installation as a separate government agency directly responsible to the President.

Role of Foreign Policy

There should be no fear that the State Department would lose control of the formulation of foreign policy. Through normal and proper liaison with the propaganda agency, the diplomatic agency can not only recommend courses of action but would be in a position to disclaim responsibility in case of complaints by other nations. Such complaints are a positive indication that the target has been hit. The post of Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs in the State Department would be retained for liaison with all outside agencies, particularly propaganda. The present informational activities in American

embassies would continue, on a reduced scale, but would be coordinated to become a real part of the propaganda effort.

Under the proposed reorganization the Psychological Strategy Board would be given a real function. Properly constituted, its studies and advice would receive appropriate consideration. Propaganda could then draw on the best talent available in this country.

Many diplomats realize and regret the effects of propaganda as practiced at present. The glaring weakness is that the diplomatic function, enmeshed with propaganda, cannot take either a bold initiative or accomplish its task of direct attack. Thus it does not strengthen—it weakens United States foreign policy.

It is obvious, therefore, that since the conduct of propaganda is at the heart of our whole psychological action, its removal from the jurisdiction of the State Department represents the top priority. This is a vital task of the new Administration.

Newsletter

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Koreans have been trained to replace them, there will follow a period of anxiety while the West measures the ability of the local armies when they are put to the test of going it alone. The United States gives no indication of changing its policy of maintaining bases in the Far East—in the Philippines, the Ryukyus and Japan—but the forces assigned to those bases may be insufficient in numbers to reinforce the anti-Communist troops in the current Asian wars if need should arise. Despite the risk of Communist victories in Korea and Indochina, United States policy as now being developed rests on the belief that, militarily and politically, Asia is the responsibility of Asians.

BLAIR BOLLES



A New Balance of Power for Europe?

The Dulles-Stassen swift survey of Western Europe, the French draft protocols to the European Defense Community treaty, the British arrests of German Nazis, the growing Kremlin pressure on West Berlin, the political maneuvers now taking place in preparation for the elections to be held this summer in Italy and West Germany—all these rapidly unfolding events highlight impending changes in the balance of power on the European continent. These changes are emerging simultaneously in the economic, political and diplomatic spheres.

Drive for Trade

The revived economies of Western Europe, strengthened by Marshall plan transfusions, are strongly competing with each other for outlets for their manufactured goods. This competition is sharpened by the hitherto privileged position of West Germany, which has not only staged a miraculous recovery with American aid but, unlike the NATO countries, does not yet have to divert production from peacetime output to the manufacture of armaments and is therefore in a strong position to recapture old markets or develop new ones in Latin America, Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Some French observers, in fact, believe that Germany, through the Schuman plan, to which the French colonies as well as France have been linked, may win a commanding position in the economic development of France's colonial empire such as it did not enjoy before World War II.

In this drive for trade all the Western European nations are looking toward enlarged markets in the United

States. Recognizing the reluctance of our Congress to continue economic aid, the Europeans stress their own preference for trade which would strike a better economic balance between us and our European allies. Few expect that the United States can in the visible future carry out the suggestion of Henry Ford 2nd on February 17 for a free trade policy here. Europe, however, hopes that the Eisenhower Administration will break with the Republican tradition of high tariffs and take steps to liberalize the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (riddled, as Henry Ford pointed out, by "peril points" and "escape clauses"); simplify customs procedures; and review the "Buy American Act," which puts foreign producers at an intolerable disadvantage when competing in the American market. As many spokesmen of American business have already said, if we really believe in free enterprise and a competitive system we should not be afraid of foreign competition. Should the United States prove reluctant to meet Europe's plea for "Trade, not aid," there is always the possibility that Moscow will hold out the promise, illusory though it may turn out to be, of markets in Eastern Europe, Russia and Communist China.

Struggle for Political Balance

Within the European nations the struggle to maintain moderate governments of the center against possible encroachments from extremism of the Right and Left is being accelerated by forthcoming elections in West Germany and Italy and in France by discussion of electoral reform. The excesses of the Soviet

government, notably its anti-Zionist purges in the satellite countries, and the success of Marshal Tito in ameliorating some of the harsher features of his Communist regime, have blunted the appeal of Western European Communists. This is particularly true in West Germany, where the mounting tide of refugees from East Germany offers daily proof of the fears aroused by the Soviet authorities. Russia's increasingly nationalistic policies have weakened non-Russian Communists, and it is believed in Europe that for the time being the Communists of France and Italy will effect a "strategic retreat," avoiding overt actions until a more favorable period.

Europe and the World

The danger today, according to non-Communist Europeans, is less from the Communists than from the extreme nationalists in Germany (whether or not they call themselves neo-Nazis) and from former Vichy elements in France who see an opportunity to use anticommunism to promote an authoritarian regime that would be responsible not to Parliament but to a small group of big business and politicians of the Right. The role that the Socialists—strong in West Germany, energetic in Austria, weary and pessimistic in France, divided in Italy—may play in the internal struggles for power will be revealed in future elections and parliamentary debates. It is interesting to note that Yugoslavia places increasing emphasis on the "socialist" character of its regime and its affinity with the Socialists of Western Europe, notably Britain and West Germany.

On the diplomatic plane it be-

comes daily more evident that a restored, vigorous West Germany (even though deprived for the time being of East Germany's manpower and resources) is in a position to hold the economic and ultimately the political and military balance of power on the Continent, even if France, as a result of increased American aid, can be relieved of some of its commitments in Indochina. The recovery of Germany has revived France's ancient fears of its historic foe and at the same time has put new life into German nationalism. The French are convinced that a Western European union would not offer adequate protection against the Germans, especially if West and East Germany are reunited.

At the Rome conference held during the week of February 23 the six European Defense Community nations unanimously declared that to realize the European idea and to take into account the dangers that continued to weigh upon Europe it was necessary to create the proposed European army without delay. They also agreed, again unanimously, that the French protocols, which sought to enable France to retain a greater measure of control over its armed forces than was contemplated in the defense community treaty, would be dissociated from the treaty itself.

At the same time the French are

casting about for other forces which could, if necessary, offset the power of a restored and reunited German nation. The first of these is Britain, whose prestige is rising in Paris in direct ratio to the growth of German strength. But Britain, it is recognized by European realists, will not link its destiny to a Western European union—unless Western Europe, in turn, becomes linked to a larger group that would include the United

States and Canada. The thoughts of many Europeans are therefore turning more and more to the possibility of forming a new balance of power—through the creation of a political and economic Atlantic Union commensurate with the military union envisaged in NATO and capable, depending on the course of events, of counterbalancing in Europe either Germany or the U.S.S.R.

VERA MICHELES DEAN



FPA Bookshelf

SCANDINAVIA

The Danish System of Labor Relations, by Walter Galenson. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952. \$4.50.

An extensive account of the mechanism which has given Denmark an enviable degree of industrial peace is presented in this study. Beginning with the origins of the Danish labor movement, the author describes the functioning of the Danish Labor Court, the role of the government mediator and private arbitrations, and the impact of the rise of socialism on the present labor system.

The Scandinavian States and Finland, by G. M. Gathorne-Hardy and others. London & New York, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1952. \$4.

This volume is a factual political and economic survey of the countries of northern Europe—Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Greenland, the Faeroes and Finland. A broad introduction which covers the region as a whole is followed by specific treatment of the problems and progress of each individual country in many fields—foreign relations, defense, trade, agriculture, social and political structure.

GREAT BRITAIN

Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield, by Cecil Roth. New York, Philosophical Library, 1952. \$3.75.

A compact biography of the famous British statesman by a British biographer and historian, who presents his subject in the light of Disraeli's Jewish background insofar as it affected his career, his outlook and his policies.

THE UNITED NATIONS

The Secretary-General of the United Nations: His Political Powers and Practice, by Stephen M. Schwebel. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952. \$4.75.

The political activities of the secretary-general of the League of Nations form a background for a discussion of the legal and political powers of Trygve Lie, present UN secretary-general. The UN founders intended to create a politically strong officer who would represent, not just one nation, but the world. The success of this office and its possible future development are examined by the author.

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